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Abstract
A family of models of individual discrete choice are constructed by means
of statistical averaging of choices made by a subject in a reinforcement learn-
ing process, where the subject has short, k-term memory span. The choice
probabilities in these models combine in a non-trivial, non-linear way the ini-
tial learning bias and the experience gained through learning. The properties
of such models are discussed and, in particular, it is shown that probabil-
ities deviate from Luce’s Choice Axiom, even if the initial bias adheres to
it. Moreover, we shown that the latter property is recovered as the memory
span becomes large.
Two applications in utility theory are considered. In the first, we use
the discrete choice model to generate binary preference relation on simple
lotteries. We show that the preferences violate transitivity and independence
axioms of expected utility theory. Furthermore, we establish the dependence
of the preferences on frames, with risk aversion for gains, and risk seeking for
losses. Based on these findings we propose next a parametric model of choice
based on the probability maximization principle, as a model for deviations
from expected utility principle. To illustrate the approach we apply it to the
classical problem of demand for insurance.
Keywords: Discrete choice models, Luce’s choice axiom, reinforcement
learning, expected utility principle
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1. Introduction
The problem of choice is one of the fundamental problems in psychology,
economics and behavioral biology. The second half of the last century saw a
rapid growth of theoretical works on this subject as well as increasing amount
of experimental data.
In economics, the field was dominated by expected utility theory (EUT),
its critique based on the experimental evidence and its ramifications. EUT
was put forward by Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) as a mathematical
formalization of what one can call rational preferences between contingent
prospects. EUT is an axiomatic theory that starts out with postulates about
preferences among prospects. The postulates are completeness, transitivity,
continuity and independence (substitution) axioms. The theory derives a
utility function u which assigns values to payoffs, and a random prospect X
is ranked according to its expectation E[u(X)].
Psychology differs from economics in the approach to the choice behavior
by assuming a more general description of choices as being probabilistic and
dependent on the set of alternatives offered to a subject. The axiomatic treat-
ment for discrete choice was undertaken in a seminal work by Luce (1959),
who introduced a choice axiom (Luce’s choice axiom) that postulates how
the probability to select an alternative from one set is related to the prob-
ability to select this alternative from a larger set. Luce’s theory establishes
existence of a value function v on a finite set of alternatives T such that the
probability to select i from set S ⊂ T equals
PS(i) =
v(i)∑
j∈S v(j)
, i ∈ S. (1)
Psychologically interpreted, value function (scale ratio) v(i) is a subject’s
response strength for alternative i. Under Luce’s choice axiom, choice prob-
abilities verify the principle of independence of irrelevant alternatives of Ar-
row (1951), and thus, when the latter is normative, becomes a reasonable
assumption.
Utility function and ratio scale function provide convenient tools for anal-
ysis of decision making. Empirically, the values of these functions can ob-
tained by comparing pairs of alternatives.
While the first three axioms of EUT are generally accepted, the last one,
independence axiom, drew a significant amount of critique from the exper-
imentalists, starting with Allais (1953). Over the years several alternative
2
utility theories were proposed that provide some variants of the expected
utility without the independence axiom or with its weaker version. Among
them, the generalized expected utility of Machina (1982), weighted utility
theory of Chew and MacCrimmon (1979), the regret theory developed inde-
pendently by Bell (1982), Fishburn (1982), Loomis and Sugden (1982), rank
dependent utility theory of Quiggin (1982, 1993), and the dual utility theory
by Yaari (1987). Kahneman and Tversky (1979, 1984, 1992) based on their
experimental findings, introduced framing effects, value functions, and prob-
ability weights into the analysis and incorporated them into the prospect
theory that was later developed, using the approach of the rank dependent
utility theory, into the cumulative prospect theory.
In the theory of discrete choice Luce’s choice axiom (LCA) is not a uni-
versal imperative either and there are situations where it does not apply,
as in the example provided by Debreu (1960). This example was further
developed by Tversky (1972) who attributed it to the similarity effect and
proposed aspect theory as a refinement of the probabilistic decision making.
More detailed discussion of validity of LCA can be found in Luce (1977), or
in a more recent review of Pleskac (2013).
Let us now return to the work of Luce (1959) and mention its another
major contribution, this time to the field of reinforcement learning theo-
ries. Learning theories concern with subjects building their choice probabili-
ties through experience, by adapting their responses accordingly to received
stimuli. Following Bush and Mosteller (1951, 1955) the learning models were
typically formulated in terms of the choice probabilities to select option i at
time n : P n(i), which is determined as function of the probabilities from the
last period and an outcome of some random event conditioned on the last
choice.
Luce (1957), citing works of Thurstone (1930) and Gulliksen (1953), ar-
gued that learning must be formulated in terms of the strength of response
to each alternative, with the choice probabilities being dependent variables
of responses, for example, through the relation (1). Several learning models
of this types were proposed typically with a linear law between response for
alternative i at times n and n− 1 :
Un(i) = µUn−1(i) + (1− µ)un(i), (2)
where un(i) is the response to the stimuli from the prior selection. This
approach has been widely accepted by scientific community, and used in
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such fields as mathematical biology, game theory, and engineering, see for
example Harley (1981), Roth and Erev (1995, 1998), Fudenberg and Levine
(1998), Sutton and Barto (1998).
There seems to be an unanimous agreement about general principles of
reinforcement learning and, naturally, one can turn to it as the tool in con-
structing models of individual choice. In contrast with axiomatic approaches,
one starts with a model of learning. Its parameters should be found exper-
imentally, but once fixed, the model serves as a “decision automaton” that
generates a series of choices, or in mathematical language, a stochastic pro-
cess on a suitable state space. The process is analyzed for convergence to
some stationary process, as the number of learning periods increases. In the
stationary process the choice probabilities might settle at certain values that
change little as more and more choices are being made, but we will not force
this assumption. In particular, the stationary process can be consistent with
the case when a repeated series of positive experiences with a particular alter-
native increases the probability to select this alternative in a non-negligible
way. What is needed for the theory is existence of well-defined statistical
averages for the choice probabilities. The latter are computed and recorded
as the probabilities for a discrete choice model. The model can be effectively
described as an “expected probability” choice model. However, except for
some special cases that we will mention later, it is not an LCA-type model
(1), nor any expected utility-type model.
The properties of such models is the focus of this work. To that end we
proceed, first, with the mathematical framework. In section 2 we derive exact
formulas for the choice probabilities for a finite set of alternatives, showing
by this that our approach is computationally feasible. We introduce a class of
k–term learning models, where in the process of learning a subject accounts
only for responses to the last k stimuli obtained for his/her actions. For
example, with k = 1, the response strength to alternative i at period n is
given by
Un(i) = U0(i) + un(i), i ∈ S, (3)
where U0(i) is a learning prior (bias) for alternative i, and un(i) is either
zero, if alternative i was not selected at period n − 1, or, if it was, is the
response to the received (random) stimulus for that alternative. Notice that
the contribution of the learning prior U0(i) is not diminishing in the course
of learning (as n increases) and it will enter into the formulas of asymptotic
probabilities. Another important assumption is implicitly included in (3).
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The initial priors U0(i) do not depend on the subset S of alternatives offered
to the subject. That is, at the beginning of the experiment the subject has
choice probabilities vitrifying Luce’s choice axiom. Modified by learning,
they enter into an asymptotic, expected probability model, which in general,
loses that property.
In section 3 we turn to applications and our choice here will be on deter-
ministic binary preferences, since they take a prominent place in economics.
We consider an individual presented with a set T of q alternatives. For every
pair of alternatives S = {x, y} ⊆ T, the individual constructs choice prob-
abilities for x and y from set S, according to a learning process described
above, where for simplicity we assume that the individual has very short,
one period, memory span (k = 1). The binary preference can be derived
from a probabilistic choice model in many different ways, most obvious be-
ing the trace relation which defines x ≻ y iff the probability to chose x from
set {x, y} is greater than 1/2. Depending on the parameters of the model, we
observe a wide range of behaviors. There are some extreme cases when the
binary preferences are according to EUT, while, generically, the preferences
are not transitive and violate independence axiom. Intransitivity, in partic-
ular, implies that the choice probabilities, from which the binary preferences
were derived, violate Luce’s choice axiom. There is more to it however, as
we show that the binary preferences are characterized by a “framing effect”,
with risk averse preferences for gains and risk seeking for losses, similar to
the preferences in prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1979, 1984).
The binary preferences also shown to detect persistently better alternatives,
by adhering to first order stochastic dominance.
Intransitivity of the preferences and violations of independence axiom
are two phenomena that typically enter any set of empirical data. The fact
that they are revealed in our choice model, combined with the fact that
the model is founded on the behavioral principles, warrants the interest in
the experimental verification of the model. This work however is limited
only to presentation of the model and its properties, not to establishing its
empirical validity. In section 4 we introduce a parametric variant of the
expected probability model with a partial motivation to facilitate the task of
performing statistical tests.
The material of sections 2 and 3 serves as a motivation for a model for
“deviations from the EU principle”, which we describe in section 4. The
model is best described as a mediator between two expected utility principles.
One is based on maximization of response E[u(X)]. The other is based on
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the minimization of
E
[
1
1 + eu(X)
]
,
the quantity related to the expected probability. One can notice the depen-
dence of this type of preferences on a “frame” through the shift of scales
from u to u+u0, which can change the ordering of preferences. Interestingly
enough it also establishes higher risk aversion for gains, and risk seeking for
losses, even if u itself is risk averse (concave), the phenomenon that we have
mentioned earlier. A generic case, described by formulas (8)–(10) on page
13, combines two types of EU principles into one. This case, however, is not
EU-type principle any longer. At the end of section 4 we apply the model
of “deviations from EUT” to a classical problem of determining demand for
insurance.
2. K-period reinforcement learning choice model
2.1. Response
All reinforcement learning models have three ingredients in common. The
reinforcement schedule, the response, as a function of the stimulus, and the
choice probabilities depending on the response strength. We will follow the
approach of Luce (1959), according to which a subject has a mental record
of responses to each choice alternative and updates them according to the
realized reinforcement (stimulus) for a corresponding alternative. Then, the
subject implements choice through a subject-specific function that selects an
alternative with a probability proportional to the response strength for this
choice.
Consider a succession of experiments in which a subject is offered a stim-
ulus for an alternative he chooses. Let rni be the reinforcement given to the
subject at nth trail, when alternative i was chosen last. We assume that
each rni is sampled from a random variable Ri, independently from other al-
ternatives and independently from one period to another. Reinforcement is
measured in the experiment-dependent units such as dollars, carrots, inten-
sities of light signals, etc.
Let Uni be the total response strength for alternative i that subject has
for this alternative at the end of trial n. It expresses the cumulative effect
of the past reinforcements for alternative i on the subject’s attitude toward
this alternative on some internal scales.
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Reinforcement-to-Response law: we will assume that the total response
strength is additive over the incremental response strengths from each rein-
forcement. That is, there is a subject specific function u = u(r) that maps
the reinforcement value r into the subject’s response scales such that
Uni = U
0
i +
∑
j∈[0..k−1]
u(rn−ji )/N(n, i), (4)
where we agreed that if alternative i is not selected during period j, then
u(rji ) = 0. N(n, i) is the count of the number of times during the last k trials
when alternative i was selected. A partial justification for the short-memory
model are the findings of Kaheman and Trversky (1979) in the context of
utility theory. They report that choices are governed by the increments in
the subject’s wealth rather than the total accumulated wealth. The law (4)
expresses the balance of contributions of the default response U0i and new ex-
perience to the total response strength, when the former has non-diminishing
contribution. (4) can be thought as a balance between the instinct and the
experience, or the balance between things learned in childhood, or bias, and
the presents reinforcement.
Response-to-Probability law: choice probability P ni for alternative i is
determined through the relation
P ni =
Φ(Uni )∑n
j=1Φ(U
n
j )
, (5)
where Φ = Φ(U) is a re-scaling of the subject’s response values U into
the range of strictly positive numbers. The function is selected to be non-
decreasing to preserve the ordering of responses.
2.2. Statistical count
Consider now an experiment in which a subject is responding according
to the rule just described. An outside observer with a capacity for statistical
computations will notice that the proportion of times each alternative i is
selected becomes fixated with time and settles at certain positive number
P¯T (i). Appendix section gives the formal mathematical account of this type
of asymptotic behavior together with the formulas for probabilities
{
P¯T (i)
}
.
When the experiment is repeated with T replaced by any subset S ⊂ T, it
leads to probabilities
{
P¯S(i)
}
for alternatives to be selected from S. In this
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way we obtain a family of probability measures
P¯S(R) =
∑
j∈R P¯S(j)∑
j∈S P¯S(j)
, R ⊂ S, (6)
on subsets of T. We will refer to this set of probabilities as RL(k) choice
model. The properties of (6) are the main interest of the paper. Their
significance, hypothetically, arises from the fact that the subject may learn
the statistics of self behavior and use it next time the choice is to be made..
Or, he/she might run a quick mental “simulation” of the learning process and
come up with the same choice probabilities even when presented with choice
once. Better yet, with the memory span k = 1, when the response is based
only on the last reinforcement, the subject can “generalize” other people’
one-time experiences about the alternatives as his/her own, in arriving at
the probabilities P¯T .
These considerations warrant the interest in theoretical analysis of the
family of probabilities (6). We start with few simple observations. Consider
a special case when an experiment provides no reinforcement whatsoever.
Then, the choice probabilities
P¯S(R) =
∑
j∈RΦ(U
0
j )∑
j∈S Φ(U
0
j )
,
which verify Luce’s Choice Axiom. Another extreme case occurs when the
memory span becomes increasingly large.
2.3. Long-term-memory limit
Consider model RL(k) with increasingly large values of k.We will proceed
informally by noticing that the averages of responses to reinforcement in the
last k trails in (4) converge by the law of large numbers to the mean:∑
j∈[0..k−1]
u(rn−ji )/N(n, i)→ E[u(Ri)], i = 1..q.
Thus for large values of k and n, the total response strength for alternative
i, Uni ≈ U¯i = U
0
i + E[u(Ri)], i.e. they change little from trial to trial. In
the limit we obtain constant response levels and the corresponding choice
probabilities become LCA probabilities with the value scales Φ(U¯i), i = 1..q.
This is almost the expected utility principle. It is in fact agrees with it if
the priors U0i are all equal, or if they are proportional to the corresponding
expected response strength E[u(Ri)].
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3. Binary preference for lotteries
The probabilistic description of choice is more general than algebraic (de-
terministic), and so, there are many different ways in which the latter can
be derived from the former. Given a set of choice probabilities one can, for
example, introduce a preference relation for alternatives by postulating some
relation between the corresponding probabilities P{i,j}(i) and P{i,j}(j). One
of such preferences is called trace relation which defines i  j if and only
if P{i,j}(i) ≥ P{i,j}(j). It was shown by Luce (1959), that if the family of
probabilities PT verifies LCA, then trace relation is a weak order relation.
In this section we consider the trace relation for alternatives that are
monetary payoffs contingent on random events, with objectively known prob-
abilities. We will assume that the positive scale function Φ(u) = exp(u/β),
for some positive parameter β, the response strength function u(s) equals to
the payoff s, and denote by Ri random payoff to alternative i, and the initial
bias U0i = E[u(Ri)].
The rationale for making such selections is the following. Function Φ is
the function from the logit probability model, originated from random utility
theory, see Marschak (1960), and it is customary used as a scale function in
the models of learning, see for example Fudenberg and Levine (1998). The
response u is a linear function. We could have selected u = ar + b, a > 0, as
a generic approximation of arbitrary non-decreasing function, but in order
to simplify the exposition we restrict analysis to the case a = 1, b = 0. It
reasonable to assume that the initial bias U0i is some stochastic characteristic
of the random payoff Ri, known a priori, and having the units of “utility”
u(s). Thus, the choice of U0i as the expected “utility”. In section 4 we
consider slightly more general model. Lastly, we restrict the analysis only to
the learning models with the shortest memory span k = 1.
3.1. Intransitivity of binary preferences
Let X, Y be two lotteries. Let P¯1, P¯2 be the equilibrium probabilities
constructed from model RL(1) with set T of two alternatives. We say that
X ≻ Y if and only if P¯1 > P¯2. Equivalently (see appendix), the preference is
defined by the inequality
E
[
eE[Y ]/β
eE[Y ]/β + e((E[X]+X)/β)
]
< E
[
eE[X]/β
eE[X]/β + e((E[Y ]+Y )/β)
]
. (7)
We define relation X  Y when the inequality in (7) is not strict, and X ∼ Y
when the expectations are equal. Notice that if the alternatives are restricted
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so that they have the same expected payoffs E[X ] = const., then binary
preference ≻ corresponds to EU principle with “utility” u˜(s) = (1 + es/β)−1.
We will come back to this property in section 4.
Our first finding is that relation ≻ is not transitive. The proof of this is
postponed to the appendix as it based on some technical manipulations with
the integrals.
The intransitivity of the trace relation in its turn implies that choice
probabilities P¯S, violate Luce’s choice axiom, see Luce (1959).
Intransitivity of preferences is a severe obstacle in constructing any choice
theory which limits their usefulness. However, RL(1) model provides much
more information than just the binary preferences. In fact, any finite num-
ber of lotteries can be evaluated and and unambiguous rankings can be con-
structed. We will exploit this property in full in section 4.
3.2. Independence axiom and Allais experiment
The independence axiom for preferences states that if lottery L1 ≻ L2 and
L is any other lottery, then a complex lottery in which L1 is mixed with L in
some proportion dominates L2 mixed with L in the same proportion. This
is the axiom for expected utility that drew the earliest critique to Neumann-
Morgenstein theory, in particularly by Allais (1953).
The axiom requires preference to be linear in the probability distribution.
Quick look at the formula (7) reveals that the binary preference relation
depends in a non-linear way on the distribution of the random variables. It
is not surprising that such preferences violate the independence axiom of the
expected utility theory. To illustrate this property we consider an Allais-
type experiment. In what follows we say that lottery L(a, b : p) pays $a with
probability p and $b with probability 1− p. We shorten notation to L(c : 1)
to describe lottery with 100% of $c payoff.
We compare lottery L(c : 1) and L(1, 0 : x) according to (7). The result is
represented graphically in figure 1 on page 22. The red line divides the unit
square into two parts: below the line, the certain bet L(c : 1) ≻ L(1, 0 : x),
above, L(1, 0 : x) ≻ L(c : 1), and the line itself is the indifference curve
(certainty equivalent curve).
Similar to Allais experiment, we mix each lottery with 80% chance of
lottery L(0 : 1) which pays $0 for sure. The new lotteries to compare are
L(c, 0 : 0.2) and L(1, 0 : 0.2x), and the indifference curve is marked blue in
figure 1. The independence axiom requires the same preference between the
new lotteries as between the original. For the binary preferences in question,
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however, for all pairs (c, x) between two curves in figure 1 preferences are
reversed.
3.3. Losses and Gains
Consider now the situation when the wealth increments are framed as
losses (negative) or gains (positive). In this setting we are going to look at
the problem of determining the certainty equivalent for probabilistic lotteries
involving only positive or only negative payoffs.
First, we consider lottery L(1, 0 : x) that pays $0 with probability 1 − x
and $1 with probability x. For such lottery we find its certainty equivalent
$c according to (7). Figure 2 on page 23 shows (blue line) the corresponding
indifference curve, in the first quadrant. Then, we consider lotteries L(−1, 0 :
x) that pay $0 with probability 1−x and −1 with probability x. The red line
in the third quadrant is the indifference curve for losses. For comparison, we
draw on the same figure the expected payoff curve E[L(1, 0 : x)], which is the
same the lottery weight x.
As seen from the figure, the indifference curve for the binary preferences
lies above expected utility in the region of gains, and below it, for losses.
Thus, an agent is more risk averse, compared to the expected utility prefer-
ences, in gains, and more risk tolerant in losses. This example is a generic
fact as proved in the next
Lemma 1. Let X be a random payoff of a lottery. Then, if X ≥ 0 (X ≤ 0),
the certainty equivalent of X is less (greater) than the expected utility E[X ].
Proof. The certainty equivalent c for lottery X in the binary preferences is
defined by the equation
E
[
ec/β
ec/β + e(E[X]+X)/β
]
=
eE[X]/β
eE[X]/β + e2c/β
.
Consider first the gains: X ≥ 0. Let p(c) denote the left-hand side of the
equation, and q(c) the right-hand side. We have: p′(c) > 0, and q′(c) < 0.
Moreover,
p(E[X ]) = E
[
1
1 + eX/β
]
≥
1
1 + eE[X]/β
= q(E[X ]),
because function (1 + ex/β)−1 is convex for x ≥ 0. Thus, the point of inter-
section, c, of graphs of p and q is not greater than E[X ].
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The other case is proved analogously, using the fact that (1 + ex/β)−1 is
concave for x ≤ 0.
It should be noted that the situation in figure 2 applies only to two-valued
lotteries described there. Since (7) is not an expected utility no conclusions
about other types of lotteries can be drawn from the graph of the certainty
equivalents of such lotteries. In particular, the type of convexity of the
certainty equivalent curve can not be used to characterize (7) preferences in
the relation to the attitude toward risk.
3.4. First order stochastic dominance
We will show in this section that an individual using binary preferences
(7) can detect the prospect with persistently better payoffs than the other.
This concept is formalized as first order stochastic dominance.
Consider two lotteries X and Y. It is said that X stochastically dominates
Y, if for any non-decreasing function u and any non-increasing function v,
E[u(Y )] ≤ E[u(X)], E[v(X)] ≤ E[v(Y )].
Lemma 2. If X stochastically dominates Y, then X  Y in the binary
preferences (7).
Proof. Recall that X is better than Y if
E
[
eE[Y ]/β
eE[Y ]/β + e(E[X]+X)/β
]
≤ E
[
eE[X]/β
eE[X]/β + e(E[Y ]+Y )/β
]
.
This inequality can be proved by using the definition of the stochastic dom-
inance:
E
[
eE[Y ]/β
eE[Y ]/β + e(E[X]+X)/β
]
= E
[
1
1 + e(E[X]−E[Y ])/β)eX/β
]
≤ E
[
1
1 + e(−E[X]+E[Y ])/βeX/β
]
≤ E
[
1
1 + e(−E[X]+E[Y ])/βeY/β
]
= E
[
eE[X]/β
eE[X]/β + e(E[Y ]+Y )/β
]
.
12
4. A model for deviations from EU principle
In this section we slightly generalize the arguments presented above to
introduce a parametric model for deviations of choices from EUT. Suppose
that we are to choose among lotteries X1, .., Xq offering random monetary
payoffs. Let u be a subject utility function, and let the subject form the choice
probabilities based on RL(1) model with learning priors U0i = E[u(Xi)] and
using u(Xi) to measure his/her responses. We introduce parameter α > 0 to
measure deviations from EU into the total response function, so that
Ui = E[u(Xi)] + αu(Xi), α > 0, (8)
if i was selected last, and
Ui = E[u(Xi)],
otherwise.
With the positive scales function Φ(u) = eu/β, equilibrium choice proba-
bilities {P¯ (i)}qi=1 are determined by formula (15) from appendix:
P¯ (i) = KeU
0
i
/β
(
E
[
K0
K0 + e(U
0
i
+αu(Ri)/β − eU
0
i
/β
])−1
, i = 1..q, (9)
and K0 =
∑
i e
U0
i
/β, and K is a positive constant.
The choice is lottery Xi0 which maximizes the probability:
P¯ (i0) = max{P¯ (1), .., P¯ (q)}. (10)
Formula (9) has two parts. First, take α = 0. This corresponds to the
choices made on the basis of EU principle according to E[u(Ri)]. Now let
α, β → ∞, and at the same time fix the ratio α/β = 1. In this case the
subject is not using priors, but only one-period experience. This is also
described by another EU principle based on the minimization of
E
[
1
1 + eu(Ri)
]
. (11)
To illustrate the properties such choices, consider, for example, that the
subject uses logarithmic log(1+s) function as the response increments (rein-
forcements), but it is shifted so that the response is psychologically “framed”
at some reference value u0, so that u < u0 is considered a loss and u > u0 as
gains. Thus,
u(s) = log(1 + s)− u0, (12)
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and without loss of generality we assume that u0 = log(1+s0), for some posi-
tive s0.We will consider simple lotteries with payoffs in the interval [0, 2s0] we
determine how the subjects values them by the certainty equivalent. First we
consider a lottery in the “gains” region of [s0, 2s0]. The lottery pays $2s0 with
probability p and $s0 with probability 1− p. We parametrize p by variable x
expressed in the units of utility:
p =
x− u(s0)
u(2s0)− u(s0)
, x ∈ [u(s0), u(2s0)].
For such lottery we determine its certainty equivalent c using (11), (12), and
mark point (c, s) on the graph in figure 3 on page 24. For comparison we plot
the certainty equivalents for the lotteries but using expected utility E[u(X)],
where u is from (12). In the last case the certainty equivalent curve is simply
the graph of u(s).
For the region of losses, we repeat the construction using lottery that
pays $s0 with probability p, and $0 with 1− p, where
p =
x− u(0)
u(s0)− u(0)
, x ∈ [u(0), u(s0)].
Figure 3 shows certainty equivalents in this case as well. The certainty equiv-
alent curve is below the graph of utility for losses, and above that for gains.
In between these two extremes, decision-making based on (9)–(10) shows
deviations from the EU principle, of the similar kind as was discussed in the
previous sections, on an example of linear utility u(s) = s.
Now we apply choice model (8)–(10) to the following classical problem.
4.1. Demand for insurance
Consider a person contemplating purchasing an insurance against a loss
of $∆ that might occur next year, with objectively known probability p. The
next year earnings will be $y. An insurance company offers protection against
the loss with actuarially fair premium δ = p∆. We assume that the person
can purchase any level of insurance $a∆ for the price of $aδ, with a ∈ [−1, 2].
We assuming here that the person can overprotect (a > 1), or can actually
borrow cash on the promise to return a part of the loss if it occurs (a < 0).
In this set up we’re dealing with a simple lottery Ya described in table 1.
Consider model (8) with α = 0, with logarithmic utility u(s) :
u(s) = log(4 + c)− log 8.
14
payoff probability
y − ap∆ p
y −∆+ (1− p)a∆ 1− p
Table 1: Values of lottery Ya.
It is an EU principle of maximization of E[u(Ya)]. For a concave utility u(s),
the solution is always a = 1, for any level of income y, probability of loss p,
and loss ∆ > 0.
Consider model (8) with α/β = 0.4, α, β → +∞, and same u(s). Notice
that income Ya < 4 is treated as a loss and Ya > 4 as a gain. We consider here
the levels of income y ∈ [0, 10], and loss ∆ = 2, comparable to the income.
The selection is now based on the minimization of a functional similar to
(11). The solution is shown in figure 4 on page 25. The figure shows the
amount of insurance a one buys, as a function of the level on income y and
the loss probability p. Due to different risk attitude for losses and gains the
decision depends on the values of y and p. Notice that among all possible
values of a ∈ [−1, 2] only three are being selected: a = −1, 1 and 2. That is,
the choice undergoes phase transition in (y, p) values.
To illustrate the selection by non-EU choice model, take α = 0.4, β = 1.
The model applies only to finite number of alternatives. In fact, it depends
non-trivially on the number of alternatives through parameter K0 in (9).
We will give a person the choice between levels of insurance from a = −1
to a = 2 with increment of 0.5, totaling to q = 7 choices. Figure 5 shows
which one is selected depending on y and p. Notice that again that the choice
is mostly between three values a = −1, 1, 2, similar to that of the second case,
when y > 4. The same values, somewhat symmetrically appear in the region
y < 4, and for y < 1 solution becomes a = 1, as in the risk averse case. Thus
the model shows deviations from EUT (a = 1) in the middle section of the
figure, around a point of framing, the width of this region depending on the
parameters of the model.
5. Appendix
5.1. Model RL(k)
In this section we will give a proof that in the course of the learning
according to the process described section 2, the choice probabilities settle
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at some equilibrium values and provide the formulas for them. To simplify
the presentation but not the generality we will assume that choices are made
from the set of all n alternatives.
The learning process can be described as a Markov chain on the finite
state space Sk of k most recent alternatives that a subject has selected, i.e.,
Sk = {(i1, .., ik) : ij ∈ 1..n} .
We denote the stochastic process as Xn = (in1 , .., i
n
k). From the formula (4)
we see that the state Xn+1 is completely determined from the current state
Xn, i.e. {Xn}∞n=0 is a Markov chain.
We will proceed with the computation of the transition probabilities from
the state i¯ = (i1, .., ik) to the state m¯ = (m1, .., mk), that we denote by
p(m¯ : i¯). This probability is zero unless m2 = i1, m3 = i2, .., mk = ik−1. In
the remaining cases, according to (4) and (5) for j = 1..n,
p(j, i1, i2, .., ik−1 : i1, .., ik) = E
[
Φ(Uj)∑n
l=1Φ(Ul)
]
> 0, (13)
where
Ul = U
0
l +
∑
l∈[1..k]
u(Ril)/N(l, i1, .., ik, Ri1 , .., Rik),
and N(l, i1, .., ik, ri1 , .., rik) is a random variable that counts the number of
times alternative l has been selected, given the last k selections i1, .., ik and
the last k reinforcements ri1, .., rik . The expectation in (13) is with respect
to the joint distribution of independent random variables (Ri1 , .., Rik).
The Markov chain {Xn}∞i=0 is irreducible and all states are ergodic, see
the monograph of Feller (1957) for the theory Markov chains. This implies
that the distribution of Xn converges to an invariant measure on Sk that
we denote my µ. The probability that alternative i has been selected last is
computed from µ by the formula
P¯T (i) =
∑
i2,..,ik∈[1..n]
µ(i, i2, .., ik).
For the learning model with k = 1 computation of {P¯T} is somewhat sim-
plified. The details are presented below as this is the case of the principle
interest of the paper.
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For k = 1, S1 = {1, .., n} is simply the set of alternatives, and the tran-
sition probabilities equal
p(j : i) = E
[
Φ(Uj)∑n
l=1Φ(Ul)
]
> 0,
where
Ul =
{
U0i + u(Ri), l = i,
U0l , l 6= i.
The vector of equilibrium measure µ = (µ(1), .., µ(n))t is determined from
the linear system
µ =Mµ, (14)
where the elements of the transition matrix M equal Mj,i = p(j : i). The i
th
equation in this system reads:
µ(i) =
∑
k 6=i
µ(k)E
[
Φ(U0i )∑
l 6=k Φ(U
0
l ) + Φ(U
0
k + u(Rk))
]
+ µ(i)E
[
Φ(U0i + u(Ri))∑
l 6=iΦ(U
0
l ) + Φ(U
0
i + u(Ri))
]
.
It can be rearranged as
µ(i) =
∑
k
µ(k)E
[
Φ(U0i )∑
l 6=k Φ(U
0
l ) + Φ(U
0
k + u(Rk))
]
+
+ µ(i)E
[
Φ(U0i + u(Ri))− Φ(U
0
i )∑
l 6=iΦ(U
0
l ) + Φ(U
0
i + u(Ri))
]
,
or as
µ(i)(Φ(U0i ))
−1
E
[ ∑
l Φ(U
0
l )∑
l 6=iΦ(U
0
l ) + Φ(U
0
i + u(Ri))
]
=
∑
k
E
[
µ(k)∑
l 6=k Φ(U
0
l ) + Φ(U
0
k + u(Rk))
]
.
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The right-hand side of this equation is independent of i; we denote it by K.
Also we assign K0 =
∑
l Φ(U
0
l ). Then, the last equation provides a formula
µ(i) = KΦ(U0i )
(
E
[
K0
K0 + Φ(U
0
i + u(Ri))− Φ(U
0
i )
])−1
, i = 1..q. (15)
The set of equilibrium choice probabilities {P¯T} is the same as measure µ. If
only two alternatives are present, T = {1, 2}, (14) can be reduced to a single
equation, since µ(1) + µ(2) = 1 :
µ(1)E
[
Φ(U02 )
Φ(U02 ) + Φ(U
0
1 + u(R1))
]
= µ(2)E
[
Φ(U01 )
Φ(U01 ) + Φ(U
0
2 + u(R2))
]
,
(16)
which we use in applications to compute ratio µ(1)/µ(2).
5.2. Intransitivity
Lemma 3. For the binary preferences defined in (7), there are lotteries
X, Y, Z such that X ≻ Y, Z ≻ X but Y ≻ Z.
Proof. We will show that there are X, Y, Z such that X  Y, Z  X but
Y ≻ Z, i.e. that  is not transitive. The lotteries X, Y, Z can be suitably
perturbed to show that ≻ is not transitive as well.
Let X, Y be two lotteries such that E[X ] = E[Y ] = 0,
E
[
1
1 + eX
]
= E
[
1
1 + eY
]
, (17)
and
E
[
eX
(1 + eX)2
]
> E
[
eY
(1 + eY )2
]
(18)
Let Z¯ be a lottery with E[Z¯] = 0 and
E
[
1
1 + eZ¯
]
> E
[
1
1 + eX
]
. (19)
First we establish the following
Claim 1. For any number z0 > 0 there is z ∈ (0, z0) and a lottery Z such
that E[Z] = z, and
E
[
1
1 + ez+Z
]
= E
[
1
1 + e−z+X
]
. (20)
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Proof. Consider functions f(z) = E
[
1
1+e2z+Z¯
]
and g(z) = E
[
1
1+e−z+X
]
. From
(19) we have f(0) > g(0).Moreover f(z) is monotone function with f ′(0) < 0,
and g(z) is monotone with g′(0) > 0 as can be verified by taking derivatives.
If lottery Z¯ is chosen sufficiently close to X, graphs of f(z) and g(z) will
intersect at some point in the interval (0, z0). For such point, call it z, and
lottery Z = z + Z¯, equation (20) holds.
Condition (17) means that X  Y. Consider function f(z) = E
[
1
1+e−z+X
]
and g(z) = E
[
1
1+e−z+Y
]
. Conditions (17),(18) imply that there is z0 > 0 such
that for all s ∈ (0, z0),
E
[
1
1 + e−s+X
]
> E
[
1
1 + e−s+Y
]
.
Given this z0 and using the claim we find z ∈ (0, z0) and lottery Z, such (20)
holds, which implies that Z  X. On the other hand
E
[
1
1 + e−z+X
]
> E
[
1
1 + e−z+Y
]
.
Thus,
E
[
1
1 + ez+Z
]
> E
[
1
1 + e−z+X
]
.
By formula (7) it implies that Y ≻ Z (recall that E[Z] = z, E[Y ] = 0), while
(17) establishes that X  Y.
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Figure 1: Allais Paradox. Red line is the certainty equivalent for lottery L(1, 0 : x). Blue
line represents points (c, x) for which lotteries L(1, 0 : 0.2x) are equivalent to L(c, 0 : 0.2).
The region between two curves is set of points for which Allais paradox holds. RL(1) model
has positive scale function Φ(u) = eu/0.1 and learning priors U0 = E[L(1, 0 : x)] = x.
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Figure 2: Certainty equivalent curves for simple lotteries for losses and gains according to
EUT (blue) and the binary preferences from RL(1) model (red). The function of positive
scales Φ(u) = eu/.1.
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Figure 3: Certainty equivalent curves for simple lotteries for losses and gains according
to EU (blue) and model (8)-(10) (red). Utility u(c) = log(1 + c) − log 3. Transition from
losses to gains occurs at c = 2. The function of positive scales Φ(u) = eu/.2.
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Figure 4: Demand for insurance I. The figure shows fraction a of purchased insurance (in
color) for every pair of (y, p) – level of income and probability of loss, according to the
model (8)–(10) with parameters α, β = +∞, α/β = 0.4.
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Figure 5: Demand for insurance II. The figure shows fraction a of purchased insurance
(in color) for every pair of (y, p) – level of income and probability of loss, according to the
model (8)–(10) with parameters α = 0.4, β = 1.
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